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Abstract—The Pliable Index CODing (PICOD) problem is a
variant of the Index Coding (IC) problem, where the desired
messages by the users, who are equipped with message side
information, is part of the optimization. This paper studies the
PICOD problem where users are subject to a privacy constraint.
In particular, the following spacial class of private PICODs is
investigated: 1) the side information structure is circular, and
2) each user can decode one and only one message. The first
condition is a special case of the “circular-arc network topology
hypergraph” class of PICOD studied in [6], for which an optimal
solution was given without the privacy constraint. The second
condition was first studied in [8] and was motivated by the need
to keep content privacy is some distribution networks.
This paper proposes both converse and achievable bounds.
The proposed achievable scheme not only strictly outperforms
the one in [8] for some values of the system parameters, but it is
also information theoretically optimal in some settings. For the
remaining cases, the proposed linear code is shown to require at
most one more transmission than the converse bound derived by
restricting the sender to only use linear codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
a) Pliable Index Coding (PICOD): PICOD is a variant
of the Index Coding (IC) problem and was first introduced
in [2]. In PICOD, the messages to be decoded by the users,
who have message side information, are not part of the
problem definition. Instead, in PICOD, the sender assigns to
the users the messages they need to decode so that (i) the
assigned messages were not already present in the local side
information, and (ii) the length of the code that allows every
user to recover the assigned message has the shortest possible
length. The PICOD problem formulation captures the nature of
some content delivery applications, where there is flexibility in
the choice of the desired messages to be delivered to the users.
This flexibility allows to reduce the number of transmissions
compared to an IC with the same side information structure.
The IC problem in its general form is known to be hard [1].
The general PICOD problem is not simpler than the IC prob-
lem in terms of complexity. For instance, the linear PICOD
(here the sender is restricted to use linear codes) is still NP-
hard [9]. Some efficient algorithms to solve the general PICOD
were proposed in [10]. For the case where the side information
structure of the PICOD has “symmetry,” we found the optimal
code length (under no restriction of encoding scheme that the
sender can use) in [6]. However, the general PICOD problem
is open.
b) Private PICOD: The problem of security and privacy
in IC has been studied from different perspectives. In [3],
the Authors proposed an IC model where an eavesdropper
has a limited access to the side information sets and to
the transmitted codeword; the goal here is to prevent the
eavesdropper from obtaining any new information. In [5], the
Authors considered an IC model where the sender must design
a code that allows each user to decode its desired message, but
at the same time prevent him from obtaining any information
about the side information or the desired messages of the
other users. This latter model has the flavor of the private
information retrieval problem [11], where a user wants to
hide its desired message and/or side information from the
other users and the server. Similarly to the private information
retrieval problem, the Authors of [7] formulated the private
IC problem, where a user in the IC problem should be able
to decode only its own desired messages but no others.
Recently, in [8], the Authors extended the private IC prob-
lem in [7] to the PICOD framework. Only the case where the
side information structure is “circular”, and where each user
can decode one and only one message was considered in [8].
Several schemes were given in [8] and shown to provide the
desired level of privacy, but the optimality is discussed only
under the linear encoding constraint for some cases.
c) Contributions and Paper Organization: In this paper
we study a generalization (in terms of the form of the side
information sets) of the private PICOD model from [8], as
formally described in Section II. We provide both achievable
and the converse bounds, where past work only focused on
linear achievable schemes. The main result of this paper is
presented and discussed in Section III. In Section IV we derive
both information theoretic and linear-code restricted converse
bounds. We also provide linear achievable schemes and show
they are either information theoretically optimal, or differ from
the linear-code restricted converse by at most one transmission.
Section V concludes the paper. Some proofs are in Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A private pn,m,Aq PICODptq is defined as follows. There
are n P N users and one central transmitter. The user set is
denoted as U :“ tu1, u2, . . . , unu. There are m P N indepen-
dent and uniformly distributed binary messages of κ P N bits
each. The message set is denoted as W :“ tw1, w2, . . . , wmu.
The central transmitter has knowledge of all messages W .
User ui has the messages indexed by its side information set
Ai Ă rms, i P rns. The messages index by Ai are denoted as
WAi . The collection of all side information sets is denoted as
A :“ tA1, A2, . . . , Anu, which is assumed globally known at
all users and the transmitter.
The sender and the users are connected by an error-free
broadcast link. The sender transmits the codeword
xκℓ :“ ENCpW ,Aq, (1)
where ENC is the encoding function.
The decoding function for user uj is
t pwpjq
1
, . . . , pwpjqt u :“ DECjpWAj , xκℓq, @j P rns, (2)
where t is the number of messages desired by a user and not
already included in Aj . In other words, the decoding function
at uj is DECj , j P rns, such that
PrrDtdj,1, . . . , dj,tu XAj “ H :
t pwpjq
1
, . . . , pwpjqt u ‰ twdj,1 , . . . , wdj,tus ď ǫ, (3)
for some ǫ P p0, 1q and some Dj :“ tdj,1, . . . , dj,tu Ď
rmszAi. We set Dj contains the indices of the desired mes-
sages by uj .
Up to this point, the system definition is that of a classical
PICOD problem. We introduce now the privacy constraint.
Privacy is modeled here as follows: user uj can not decode
any messages other than the t messages indexed by Dj .
Specifically, we impose that for all j P rns,
Hpwi|x
κℓ,WAj ,Aq
ěHpwiq ´ κǫ,@i P rmszpDj YAjq. (4)
A code is called valid for the private pn,m,Aq PICODptq
if and only if it satisfies the conditions in (3) and (4). The
goal is to find a valid code and a desired message assignment
that result in the smallest possible codelength, i.e.,
ℓ‹ :“ mintℓ : D a valid xκℓ for some κu. (5)
Finally, if the encoding function at the sender is restricted
to be a linear map from the message set, the length of shortest
possible such valid codewords is denoted as ℓ‹
lin
.
A. Network Topology Hypergraph (NTH) and size-s circular-h
shift Side Information
In the rest of the paper we shall consider a class of pn,m,Aq
private PICODptq problems with a specific structure on A.
Such class is a generalization of the one studied in the past
work [8], which is a special case of the circular-arc NTH that
we studied in [6], where we fully solved the case t “ 1 for
the circular-arc NTH without the privacy constraint. The rest
of the section contains graph definition that will be used later
on.
Let H “ pV, Eq denote a hypergraph with vertex set V
and edge set E , where an edge E P E is a subset of V . The
NTH, first introduced in [6], is a generalization of network
topology graph for the IC problem [4]. In a NTH, messages
are the hyperedges, while the users are the vertices. A user
does NOT have a message in its side information set if and
only if its corresponding vertex is incident to the hyperedge
that represents the message. A 1-factor of H is a spanning
edge induced subgraph ofH that is 1-regular. A hypergraphH
is called an circular-arc hypergraph if there exists an ordering
of the vertices v1, v2, . . . , vn such that if vi, vj , i ď j, then the
vq for either all i ď q ď j, or all q ď i and q ě j, are incident
to an edge E.
In this paper we study the pn,m,Aq private PICODp1q with
a special side information set structure: the sets in A are size-s
circular-h shift of the message set. More precisely, The side
information set of user ui is of the form
Ai “ tpi´ 1qh` 1, . . . , pi ´ 1qh` su, (6)
for i P rns where all indices are intended modulo the size
of the message set, i.e., denoted as pmod mq when needed,
where 0 ď s ď m´ t and h ě 1, here t “ 1.
Let g :“ gcdpm,hq. In this private PICODp1q there are
n “ m{g users, since all users have distinct side information
sets. Note that the size-s circular-h shift side information setup
is a special case of the side information structure with circular-
arc we introduced in [6]. Also, the model studied in [8] is the
special case when g “ 1 (and thus n “ m).
III. MAIN RESULT
For the size-s circular-h shift side information private
PICODp1q problem, we have the following main result.
Theorem 1. For the private PICODp1q where the side infor-
mation sets are as in (6) we have the following.
Impossibility: when m is odd, g “ 1, and either s “ m´ 2
or s “ 1, a valid code does not exists (i.e., it is not possible
to satisfy the privacy constraint).
For the remaining possible cases, we have:
‚ For s ě m{2, and either 1 ď s ă m{2, g ě 3, or 1 ď
s ă m{2, s ‰ 2, g “ 2
ℓ˚ “
#
1, if the NTH has a 1-factor,
2, otherwise.
(7)
‚ For 1 ď s ă m{2, and either g “ 1 or s “ g “ 2
rt
m
s
u{2s ď ℓ‹lin ď
#
rtm
s
u{2s, m
s
P Z,
rtm
s
u{2s` 1, m
s
R Z.
(8)
A few observations are in order. When s ě m{2, the
achievable scheme provided in [8] is indeed information
theoretical optimal given (7), which is our converse bound
in [6, Theorem 3] for the case without privacy constraint.
Therefore, our main contribution in Theorem 1 is three-fold
compared to [8]: 1) for s ě m{2 we provide information
theoretic optimality of the scheme in [8]; 2) for s ă m{2 we
provide a new achievable scheme, and show it is almost linear
optimal; 3) we generalize the side information structure to any
g ą 1.
In (8), if we fix s and g, tm
s
u is monotonic in the message
set size m. One interesting observation is that, although the
lower bound on ℓ‹
lin
is monotonic with m, the upper bound
is not. For instance, consider the case s “ 2, g “ 1; when
m “ 10 or m “ 12, we have ℓ‹
lin
ď 3, while when m “ 11
we have ℓ‹
lin
ď 4. In other words, from the point of m “ 11,
both increasing and decreasing the message set size may result
in an increase of the required number of transmissions. Note
that this is the point where the upper and the lower bounds
differ. It is not clear at this point whether this means the
achievable scheme here is not optimal, or the optimal private
linear PICOD solution is not monotonic in m.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We divide the proof of Theorem 1 into various cases.
Specifically, the impossibility result is proved in Section IV-A,
the case s ă m{2, g “ 1 in Section IV-B, and the case
s ă m{2, g “ s “ 2 in Section IV-C. The schemes that
achieve (7) are sketched in Section IV-D, while the full proof
can be found in Appendix D.
A. Impossible Cases
First we show that in some cases the privacy constraint
can not be satisfied. The proof of the same under a linear
encoding constraint was provided in [8]. Here we provide a
simple information theoretic proof of the same. The main idea
is to proof the existence of a “decoding chain” (as defined
in [6]) regardless of the choices of the desired messages at
the users. This “decoding chain” technique was used in [6]
for the converse proof of so called consecutive complete–
S PICODptq. Since this argument does not rely on any
assumption on the encoding function at the server, the resulting
bound is truly information theoretical (as opposed to a form
of ‘restricted converse’).
1) Case m is odd, s “ m´2, and g “ 1: User ui has two
possible choices for its desired message (because all the others
are in its side information set); these messages are di “ pi `
sq pmodmq or di “ pi´1q pmodmq. If di “ pi`sq pmodmq,
by decoding wdi , user ui can mimic upi´1q pmod mq since
Api´1q pmod mq Ă tpi ` sq pmod mqu Y Ai. Therefore, user
ui can decode wdpi´1q pmod mq . To make sure user ui can
decode only one message, we need dpi´1q pmod mq P Ai so
that user ui does not decode another message that is not in its
side information set. We thus have di P Api´1q pmod mq and
dpi´1q pmod mq P Ai can mimic each other. We say that two
user mimicking each other form a “loop”. The same argument
holds for the other choice of di as well. To make sure all users
can decode one message only, every user must be in a “loop”.
However, one user can be in only one loop. Thus, there must
be one user that is not contained in any loop because here we
have taken m to be odd. Therefore, there exists one user that
can mimic another user and thus decode two messages, which
violates the privacy constraint.
2) Case m is odd, s “ 1, and g “ 1: User ui, by decoding
its desired message di “ j, j ‰ i, can mimic user uj and
thus also decode dj . To make sure user ui can decode only
one message, we must have dj “ i. Therefore user ui and uj
form a “loop”. Similarly, every user can be in only one loop.
We need all users to be in a loop to make sure that every
user can decode at most one message. Since m is odd, this is
impossible. Thus, there must exists one user that can decode
two messages, which violates the privacy constraint.
B. Case s ă m{2 and g “ 1 (here m “ n)
1) Achievability: Let m “ 2sq ` r for some q, r P Z such
that 0 ď r ă 2s, i.e., r is the remainder of m modulo 2s,
and q is the maximum number of users who can have disjoint
side information sets. We can have 2q` t r
s
u groups of s users
such that the users in each group have at least one message in
common in their side information sets. Also, r ´ st r
s
u is the
number of users that are not contained in any of these groups.
The intuition of our achievable scheme is as follows. Under
the privacy constraint, we can satisfy the users in two groups
with one transmission, therefore 2sq users can be satisfied by
q transmissions. If r “ 0, q transmissions suffice; if 0 ă r ď s,
we can satisfy the remaining r users by one transmission; and
if s ă r ă 2s, we can satisfy the remaining r users by two
transmissions. Therefore the total number of transmissions is
q`r r
s
s. Based on this intuition, we distinguish three sub-cases:
a) r “ 0; b) 0 ă r ď s; and c) s ă r ă 2s.
Case r “ 0: This is the case where m is divisible by 2s,
therefore is divisible by s. We partition the users into groups
G1, G2, . . . , G2q , such that all users in Gi have message wis
in their side information. Set the desired message of the users
in G2i, i P rqs, to be wp2i´1qs, and the desired message of the
users in G2i´1, i P rqs to be w2is There are q transmissions,
each of them is w2is ` wp2i´1qs, i P rqs, that satisfies the
users in Gi and Gi`1 while it does not provide any useful
information for the users in other groups. Therefore, q “ m
2s
transmissions suffice to satisfy all the m users.
Case 0 ă r ď s: We partition the users into 2q ` 1
groups. As for to the case r “ 0, the first 2q groups
contain s users. The users in Gi, i P r2qs, all have wis in
their side information. Group G2q`1 has r users. The first q
transmissions are w2is`wp2i´1qs, i P rqs, and satisfy the users
in groups Gi, i P r2qs. We next satisfy the users in G2q`1.
If r “ 1, we have G2q`1 “ tumu. Let dm “ s ` 1 and
the pq ` 1q-th transmission be ws`1 `
ř
jPAm
wj . Note that
s ě r ` 1 “ 2, therefore user um can decode ws`1 while the
other users can not decode any new messages one they receive
the last transmission.
If r ě 2, the users in G2q`1 all have Wr1:s´rsYtmu in
their side information. Let d2sq`1 “ s ´ r ` 1 and dj “
2sq ` 1, j P r2sq ` 2 : ms. The pq ` 1q-th transmission is
w2sq`1 ` wm `
řs´r`1
j“1 wj . Since user u2sq`1 can compute
w2sq`1 `wm`
řs´r
j“1 wj and users uj, j P r2sq` 2 : ms, can
compute wm`
řs´r`1
j“1 wj , these users have the message that
is not in their side information set as their desired message.
All the other users who are not in G2q`1 have at least two
messages unknown in the transmission and thus cannot decode
it. Therefore, each user can decode only one message by the
achievable scheme with q` 1 transmissions. If m is divisible
by s, then r “ s and q` 1 “ rm
2s
s; if m is not divisible by s,
q ` 1 “ rtm
s
u{2s` 1.
Case s ă r ă 2s: We partition the users into 2q ` 2
groups. The users in group Gi, i P r2q ` 1s, all have
message wpisq, while the users in group G2q`2 all have
Wr1:2s´rsYtmu. We satisfy the first 2q groups by sending
w2is ` wp2i´1qs, i P rqs. We satisfy all users in G2q`1 by
sending w2sq`1 `w2sq`s `w2sq`s`1. If r “ s` 1, G2q`2 “
tumu and we let dm “ s ` 1 and send as last transmission
ws`1 `
ř
jPAm
; otherwise, we let d2sq`s`1 “ 2s ´ r ` 1
and dj “ 2sq ` s ` 1, j P r2sq ` s ` 1 : ms and send
w2sq`s`1 ` wm `
ř
2s´r`1
i“1 wi. One can verify that all users
can decode one and only one message by using a code of
length q ` 2 “ rtm
s
u{2s` 1.
2) Converse: Messages are bit vectors of length κ, for some
κ; we thus see each message as an element in F2κ . When the
sender uses a linear code (on F2κ), we can write the transmit-
ted codeword as xℓ “ Ewm, where wm “ pw1, w2, . . . , wmq
T
is the vector containing all the messages, and where E P Fℓˆm
2κ
is the generator matrix of the code. We denote the linear span
of the row vectors of E as SpanpEq. Recall that in this setting,
user ui, i P rns, must to be able to decode one and only one
message outside its side information set Ai; the index of the
decoded message is di. Let vi,j be a vector whose j-th element
is non-zero and all elements with index not in Ai are zeros.
A valid generator matrix E must satisfy the following two
conditions:
1) Decodability: vi,di P SpanpEq, for all i P rms;
2) Privacy: vi,j R SpanpEq for all i P rms, j P rmszpAi Y
tdiuq.
The decodability condition guarantees successful decoding of
the desired message wdi by user ui as argued in [1]. The
privacy condition must hold because the existence of a vector
vi,j P SpanpEq for some j P rmszpAi Y tdiuq implies that
user ui is able to decode message wj in addition to its desired
message wdi .
The optimal linear code length ℓ‹
lin
is the smallest rank of
the generator matrix E, which by definition is the maximum
number of pairwise linearly independent vectors in SpanpEq.
We prove the linear converse bound by giving a lowered bound
on the maximum number of pairwise linearly independent
vectors in SpanpEq, i.e., the rank of E. To do so, we need the
following two propositions, proved in Appendices A and B,
respectively. These propositions are the key technical novelty
of this work.
Proposition 1. In a working system (where every user can
decode without violating the privacy condition) with g “ 1
we must have ei R SpanpEq for all i P rms, where ei are
standard bases of m-dimensional linear space.
Proposition 2. For a working system with g “ 1, among
all n users, consider k users whose side information sets are
pairwise disjoint. The number of transmissions of any linear
code that satisfies these k users must be ℓlin ě rk{2s.
Proposition 1 states that in this case, a trivial ‘uncoded
scheme’ (that consists of sending ℓ‹
lin
messages one by one)
always violates the privacy constraint. In other words, no user
is allowed to decode without using its side information.
Proposition 2 provides a lower bound on the code-length
of a linear code for a subset of the users in the system
(those with pairwise disjoint side information sets), thus for
all users. Therefore, among all m users in the system, there
are tm
s
u users with pairwise disjoint side information sets.
By Proposition 2, we need at least rtm
s
u{2s transmissions to
satisfy these users. Therefore, in order to satisfy all the users
in the system, we must have ℓ‹
lin
ě rtm
s
u{2s. This provides the
claimed lower bound.
C. Case s ă m{2 and g “ s “ 2 (here n “ m{2)
1) Achievability: In this case we show ℓ‹
lin
“ rm{4s. We
use the achievable scheme for case s “ 2 ă m{2 and g “ 1
from Section IV-B1, where we need rm{4s transmissions to
satisfy all n “ m users. We users we have in this case are a
proper subset of the users in the case g “ 1. The achievable
scheme for g “ 1 still satisfies all users and meets the privacy
constraint. We have ℓ ď rm{4s in this case.
2) Converse: The converse proof in Section IV-B2 does
not directly apply in this case, mainly because the proof of
Proposition 1 requires g “ 1. In Appendix C we show that it
also holds for g “ 2, stated as Proposition 3.
Hence the converse follows the same argument in Sec-
tion IV-B2 by replacing Proposition 1 with Proposition 3 in
Appendix C. We show that for k user with pairwise disjoint
side information sets, rk{2s transmissions are needed for this
case under the linear encoding restriction. Note that in this case
all n “ m{2 users are with pairwise disjoint side information
sets. Therefore, the total number of transmissions that satisfy
all users is at least rm{4s.
D. Remaining Cases
We aim to prove (7). Here we provide the converse proof,
and a sketch of the achievability proofs. The detailed proofs
can be found in Appendix D.
1) Converse: By the converse bound in [6, Theorem 3] for
the circular-arc PICOD(1) without the privacy constraint, we
have ℓ˚ ě 1 when the NTH has 1-factor, and ℓ˚ ě 2 when the
NTH has no 1-factor. This converse bound holds also when
we impose an additional privacy constraint.
2) Achievability for s ă m{2, either g “ 2, s ‰ 2, or
g ě 3: We show how to find the first message to transmit.
Then, all the users that do not have this message in their side
information sets must be satisfied by a second transmission.
We show how to find this second transmission in such a way
that the privacy constraint is met.
3) Achievability for s ě m{2: The achievable scheme in
this case is the one proposed in [8], where only the case g “ 1
was considered. For the cases where g ą 1, the set of users in
the system is a proper subset of the set of users when g “ 1.
Therefore the scheme for g “ 1 is still valid for any g in that
both decoding and privacy constraints are met.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we gave both achievable and converse bounds
for the private PICODp1q problem with circular side infor-
mation sets. We showed that our linear achievable scheme
is information theoretical optimal for some parameters, or it
requires at most one more transmission compared to a converse
developed under the constraint that the sender is restricted
to use linear codes. Proving, or disproving, that our linear
codes are actually information theoretically optimal is subject
of current investigation.
This work was supported in part by NSF Award number
1527059. The opinion expressed in this paper are of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the NSF.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Recall that, for g “ 1, the side information sets are Ai “
pi, . . . , i`s´1 pmod mqq for all i P rms, as here n “ m. The
proof is by contradiction. Assume without loss of generality
(wlog) that we have a working systems with e1 P SpanpEq,
that is, every user can decode message w1 without even using
its side information. Then, all users ui, i P r2 : m ´ s `
1s (who do not have w1 in their side information sets) must
have desired message w1, in order to make sure that privacy
constraint is not violated. This implies Fact 1: user u1 can
only have wd1 “ ws`1 as desired message.
Fact 1 is true because u2 desires w1, therefore A2Ytd2u Ą
A1. After decoding w1, user u2 can mimic user u1 and
thus decode message d2. Since user u2 can decode only one
message, then d1 P A2zA1 “ ts` 1u. Therefore d1 “ s` 1.
By taking d1 “ s ` 1, we conclude that there must exist
vector v1,d1 “ v1,s`1 “ c` αs`1es`1, where α P F2κ , α ‰ 0
and c P SpanpA1q, where with an abuse of notation we let
SpanpAiq denote Spanptej : j P Aiuq.
Given that we established Fact 1, let j be the position of the
fist non-zero element in the so found v1,s`1. Clearly, j ď s`1
since the ps` 1q-th element of v1,s`1 is αs`1 ‰ 0. We have
the following cases:
1) If j “ s ` 1, all the users who do not have ws`1 in
their side information sets, can decode ws`1. This is
because in this case v1,s`1 “ αes`1. Thus user us`2,
who has neither w1 nor ws`1 in its side information set,
can decode both w1 and ws`1.
2) If 1 ă j ă s ` 1, then user uj`1 can decode wj , since
s ` 1 P Aj . But user uj`1 decodes w1 by assumption.
Therefore, user uj can decode both w1 and wj .
3) If j “ 1, user us`2 can decode both ws`1 and w1.
Therefore, us`2 can decode two messages.
In all the three above cases, there exists at least one user who
can decode at least two messages, thus violating the privacy
constraint. Therefore, the original assumption e1 P SpanpEq
must be impossible in a working system. The same reasoning
applies to any ej, j P rms. This proves the claim.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
By Proposition 1, for all i P rks there exists vi,di “ αiedi`
ci P SpanpEq, where ci P SpanpAiq and αi ‰ 0. Since the side
information sets Ai are assumed to be disjoint, the vectors ci
are linearly independent. vi,di are linearly dependent only if
di P Aj and dj P Ai for some i ‰ j. In other words, there
exists a “loop” between ui and uj . Note that since the side
information sets are disjoint, one user can be in at most one
“loop”, and the number of “loops” is at most tk{2u. Therefore
the number of vi,di that are linearly dependent is at most tk{2u,
and thus the number of linearly independent vi,di is at least
k ´ tk{2u “ rk{2s. Therefore, the number of transmissions
that is needed to satisfy k users with disjoint side information
sets must satisfy ℓ “ rkpEq ě rk{2s.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proposition 3. In a working system (where every user can
decode without violating the privacy condition) with g “ s “
2 we must have ei R SpanpEq for all i P rms, where ei are
standard bases of m-dimensional linear space.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, Wlog assume e1 is in
SpanpEq. All users ui, i P r2 : m ´ s ` 1s in this case need
to desire message w1. Let d1 P Aj , for some j ‰ 1 For the
decoding at u1, there exists a vector v1,d1 P SpanpEq such
that: 1) the d1-th element is non-zero; 2) all elements with
indices that are not 1, 2 or d1 are zeros. We check the first
and second element of v1,d1 and have the following cases:
1) Both the first and second elements of v1,d1 are zeros,
v1,d1 “ edi . Therefore all users without wdi in their side
information sets can decode wdi .
2) The first element is zero while the second element is non-
zero. By v1,d1 the user uj is able decode w2 since uj
already decodes w1 and has wd1 in its side information
sets. uj can decodes two messages.
3) The first element is non-zero while the second element is
zero. Since all users that do not have w1 can decode w1,
all users can decode wd1 if they do not have it in their
side information sets.
4) Both the first and second elements of v1,d1 are non-zeros.
uj decodes w1 by assumption. It also has wdi in its side
information set. Therefore uj can decode w2.
All possible cases show that there exists at least one user that
can decode at least two messages. The assumption that e1 is
in SpanpEq is impossible. The reasoning applies to all ej, j P
rms. Therefore we conclude that ei R SpanpEq for all i P rms.
APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR THE REMAINING CASES
For the following three cases: s ă m{2, g “ 2, s ‰ 2;
s ă m{2, g ě 3; s ě m{2, we aim to prove
ℓ˚ “
#
1, if the NTH has 1-factor,
2, otherwise.
A. Converse for all three cases
By the converse bound in [6, Theorem 3] for circular-arc
PICOD, without the privacy constraint, ℓ˚ ě 1 when the NTH
has 1-factor, and ℓ˚ ě 2 when the NTH has no 1-factor.
B. Achievability for case s ă m{2, g “ 2, and s ‰ 2
If s “ 1, the NTH has 1-factor. Thus ℓ˚ “ 1, in which
case we send the sum of all messages. If 2 ă s ă m{2, we
send ws`1 as the first transmission. This transmission satisfies
all users but ui, i “ 2, . . . , ts{2u ` 1, since they all have
ws`1 in their side information set. When s is even, they have
common side information set ts`1, s`2u. We send the second
transmission as w3 ` ws`1 ` ws`2 ` ws`3. u2 can decode
ws`3, ui, i “ 3, . . . , ts{2u ` 1 can decode w3. All the other
users, after decoding ws`1, still have at least two messages
known in the summation, therefore can not decode any more
messages. When s is odd, we send the second transmission as
w3`ws`ws`1`ws`2`ws`3. By similar argument we can
show that ui, i “ 2, . . . , ts{2u ` 1 can decode one messages
from the second transmission while the other users can not.
C. Achievability for case s ă m{2, g ě 3
It is trivial that if the NTH has 1-factor we have ℓ˚ “ 1, in
which case we send the sum of all messages. Therefore, we
show that if the NTH does not have 1-factor we can satisfy
all users with two transmissions while satisfying the privacy
constraint. Send ws`1 as the first transmission. All users who
do not have ws`1 in the side information sets are satisfied.
The users that have ws`1 in the side information sets are
ui, i “ 2, . . . , ts{gu, ts{gu` 1. They have common side infor-
mation set rts{gug`1 : s`gs. |rs`2 : s`gs| ě 2 since g ě 3.
For the second transmission we send wm`
řs`g
i“s`2 wi. By the
condition s ă m{2, all users ui, i “ 2, . . . , ts{gu, ts{gu ` 1
do not have wm in the side information sets. Therefore
these users can decode wm as the desired message. For the
second transmission, all the other users have at least two
messages known in the summation, therefore can not decode
any information from the second transmission. The privacy
constraint is satisfied.
D. Achievability for case s ě m{2
We use the proposed achievable scheme in [8] for this case.
When g “ 1, [8] showed one can achieve ℓ “ 1 if the NTH has
1-factor, and ℓ “ 2 otherwise. When g ą 1, the users are in a
proper subset of the users of g “ 1. Therefore the users can
still be satisfied by the scheme that can satisfy strictly more
users. The privacy constraint is still satisfied as less users can
not decode more messages. Therefore, the achievable scheme
can achieve ℓ “ 1 when NTH has 1-factor, and ℓ “ 2 when
NTH does not have 1-factor.
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